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JONES V. SUPERIOR COURT

[58 C.2d

[Sac. No. 7393. In Bank. June 27, 1962.]

NEAL CHESTER JONES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF NEVADA COUNTY et al., Respondents.
[1] Discovery-Purpose.-Discovery is designed to ascertain the
truth in criminal as well as in civil cases.

[2] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Discovery and Inspection.
-Absent some governmental requirement that information be
kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the State has no interest in denying the accused access
to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and
in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony
of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined
and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits. To deny
flatly any right of production on the ground that an imbalance
would be created between the advantages of prosecution and
defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal
trial, the ascertainment of the facts.
[3] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery and lnspection.-Absent
the privilege against self-crimination or other privileges provided by law, defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest
in denying the prosecution access to evidence that can throw
light on issues in the case.
[4] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery a.nd lnspection.-Whether
the accused or the prosecution is seeking access to evidence
that can throw light on issues in the case, it is not less appropriate in one instance than in the other for the courts to
develop the rules governing discovery in the absence of express
legislation authorizing such discovery.
[5] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery and lnspection.-Pretrial
discovery in favor of defendants in criminal cases is not required by due process. When the Supreme Court permits discovery in advance of as well as at the trial, it is not acting
under constitutional compulsion but to promote the orderly
ascertainment of the truth; that procedure should not be a
one-way street.
[6] Witnesses - Self-crimination - Production of Papers.-Under
the rule that a defendant in a criminal case may not be com[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Discovery, Inspection, Mental and Physical
Examination, § 4 et seq.; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 9
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Discovery, § 1; [2-5] Criminal Law,
§ 104.5; [6, 7] Witnesses, § 22; [8] Witnesses, § 76(1); [9] Wit. nesses, §§ 22, 76(1).
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pelled to testify (Pen. Code, § 1323.5), he may not ordinarily
be required to produce private documents in his possession.
[7] ld.-Self-crimination-Production of Papers.-Unlike an ordinary witness, a defendant need make no showing that the
answer or document sought may be criminating, since the very
fact that the prosecution seeks it establishes that in the
prosecution's view it may be criminating.
[8] ld.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-Insofar as the prosecution seeks reports made or to be made by
physicians to whom the accused was sent by his attorney for
examination, as distinguished from advice and treatment, it
would violate the attorney-client privilege, since such reports
are communications from the accused to his attorneys through
such physicians.
[9] Id.-Self-crimination-Production of Papers: Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-The prosecution is entitled
to discover the names of witnesses the accused intends to call
and any reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence
in support of his particular defense of impotence, and insofar
as an order of the trial court requires the accused to reveal
the names and addresses of such witnesses and to produce such
reports and X-rays, it does not violate the privilege against
self-crimination or the attorney-client privilege.

PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of Nevada County and Vernon Stoll, Judge thereof,
from enforcing an order requiring petitioner to produce medical reports and other documentary material in a rape prosecution. Writ granted.
C. E. Tindall and Kern E.Tindali for Petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant
Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Attorney General,
Harold A. Berliner, District Attorney (Nevada), and Harold
F. Wolters, Deputy Distict Attorney, for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 30, 1961, the day set for his
trial on the cllarge of rape, petitioner filed a motion for continuance and an affidavit in which he alleged that he was and
for a long time had been impotent and that he needed time
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 19 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses,

131.
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 55 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses,

1460 et seq.
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to gather medical eyjdence including medical reports in connection with injuries IlC sufferell in 1053 aud 1054. The motion
was granted. Oul'\ovember 3 the dititrict attorney filed a
motiollfor discoverY,requestiug petitioner and his attorney
to make available to theprosecu tiOll: (1) the names and
addresses of any and all physicians and surgeons subpoenaed
to testify on behalf of petitioner with respect to certain injuries suffered by him in 1953 and 1954 and bearing on the
(1Uestion of whether or not petitioner is impotent; (2) the
llames and addresses of all physicians who have treated petitioner prior to the trial; (3) all reports of doctors or other
reports pertainillg to the physical condition of petitioner relating to said injuries and bearing on the qnestion whether
petitioner is impotent; and (4) all X-rays of petitioner taken
immediately following the 1953 and 1954 injuries. The court
gmnted the motion over p"titioncr's objection. Petitioner seeks
a writ of prohibition to restrain enforcement of the trial
court's order.
[1] Discovery is designed to ascertain the truth (see
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Ca1.2d 355, 375-377
[15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266]) in criminal as well as in
civil cases. (People v. Estrada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal.Rptr.
897,355 P.2d641]; People v. Cooper, 53 Ca1.2d 755, 768-771
[3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964] ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53
Ca1.2d 72, 74-76 [346 P.2d 407]; Funk v. Superior Court,
52 Cal.2d 423, 424-425 [340 P.2J 593]; People v. Durazo,
52 Ca1.2d 354,356 [340 P.2d 504] ; People v. Chapman, 52 Cal.
2d 95, 98-99 [338 P.2J 428] ; People v. Ca1·tic1·, 51 Ca1.2d 590,
594 [335 P.2d 114] ; People v. Wmiams, 51 Ca1.2d 355, 357359 [333 P.2d 19J ; Tupper v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2d 263,
265 [331 P.2d 977] ; Vance v. Superior Cvurt, 51 Ca1.2d 92,
93 [330 P.2d 773] ; Mitchell v. Superior COllrt, 50 Ca1.2d 827,
829 [330 P.2d 48] ; Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812,
819 [330 P.2d 39] ; People v. McShann, 50 Ca1.2d 802, 806-808
[330 P.2d 33] ; People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2J 737, 752-753 [312
P.2d 665] ; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704, 706-709
[312 P.2d 898] ; People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 585-588 [305
P.2d 1J.) In People v. Riser, supra, pages 585-586, we noted
that "Originally at common law the accused in a criminal
action could not compel production of documentq or other
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. [Citations.]
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to
('ompel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand
would enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and
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fabricated evidence to meet the state's case. It was felt,
furthermore, that to allow the d<'fendallt to compel production
when the prosecntion could not ill its turn compel production
from the defendant because of the privilege against self incrimination would unuuly shift to the defendant's side a
balance of advantages already heavily weighted in his favor.
[Citations.] . .. [2] Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes
of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on
issues iu the case, and in particular it has no interest ill convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have 110t been as
rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the
evidence permits. To deny fiatly any right of production Oll
the ground that an imbalance would be created between the
advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight
of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the aseertaillment of
the facts. [Citations.] " [3] Similarly, absent the privilege
against self-crimination or other privileges proyided by law,
the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in denying the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light 011
issues in the case. [ 4] Nor is it any less appropriate in one
case than in the othcr for the courts to develop the rules
governing discovery in the absence of express legislation
authorizing such discovery.
It is contended, however, that the eases permitting discovery
by defendants are not based on the power of the court to
develop rules of procedure but on the constitutional mandate
that defendants be given fair trials, and that since there is no
constitutional mandate to extend discovery to the prosecution,
the court should not do so in the absence of enabling legislation. There might be merit in these contentions had defendants been permitted discovery only when necessary to insure
due process of law. [5] Pretrial discovery in favor of defendants, however, is not required by due process. (See 18
U.S.C. § 3500; Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349
[79 8.Ct. 1217, 3'L.Ed.2d 1287] ; Campbell v. United States,
365 U.S. 85, 86 [81 8.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428] ; People v. Riser,
47 CaL2d 566,585 [305 P.2d 1) ; Louisell, Cdminal Discovery:
Dilemma Real or Apparcnt1, 49 CaLL.Rev. 56, 73-74.) Accordingly, when this court permitted discovery in advance of as
well as at the trial (Powell v. S1lperior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704
[312 P.2d 698) ; Funk v. Sllperior Court, 52 Ca1.2d 423 [340
P.2d 593] ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72 [346 P.2d
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407] ), it was not acting under constitutional compulsion but
to promote the orderly ascertainment of the truth. That procedure should not be a one-way street. (People v. Cooper, 53
Cal.2d 755, 771 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964); Powell v.
Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707 [312 P.211 698].)
Petitioner contends, however, that the discovery order in
this case violates the privilege against self-crimination (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, §§ 688, 1323, 1323.5) and the
attorney-client privilege. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 2.)
[ 6] It is settled that a defendant in a criminal case may not
be compelled to testify (Pen. Code, § 1323.5), and it has generally been held that he may not be required to produce private documents in his possession. (People v. Royce, 106 Cal.
173, 184-185 [37 P. 630, 39 P. 524) ; People v. Jackson, 2-1:
Cal.App.2d 182, 198 f74 P.2d 1085] ; People V. Rubens, 11
Cal.App.2d 576, 585 (54 P.2d 98, 1107] ; 8 Wigmore on Evidence [McNaughton rev. 1961] § 2263, pp. 379-380.) [7] Unlike an ordinary witness, a defendant need make no showing
that the answer or document sought may be incriminating
(People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 666-667 [245 P.2d 633],
and cas~s cited), for the very fact that the prosecution seeks
it, establishes that in the prosecution's view it may be incriminating. (See 8 Wigmore on Evidence [McNaughton rev. 1961]
§ 2260, p. 369.) When the prosecution has ample evidence of
the existence, identity, and authenticity of documents in the
defendant's possession and thus does not need to rely on his
knowledge to locate and to identify them or on his testimony
to authenticate them, it may be that his implied admission
alone that the documents produced were those he was ordered
to produce would involve too trivial a degree of incrimination
to justify invoking the privilege. (See Maguire, Evidence of
Guilt, pp. 22-23; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.Chi.
L.Rev. 687, 699-701.) We are not confronted with such a
case, however, for the prosecution has no independent evidence
of the existence of the reports and X-rays it seeks or the names
of the witnesses who have treated or will examine petitioner
and who could authenticate any reports or X-rays they have
made or will make. The prosecution seeks more than to require
petitioner tacitly to admit that the materials are those requested; it seeks the benefit of his knowledge of the existence
of possible witnesses and the existence of possible reports and
i X-rays for the purpose of preparing its case against him.
[8] Moreover, insofar as the prosecution seeks reports
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made or to be made by physicians to whom petitioner "was
sent by his attorney for examination, as distinguished from
advice and treatment," it would violate the attorney-client
privilege, for such reports are communications from petitioner
to his attorneys through such physieians. (San Frallcisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 5;) Ca1.2d 451, 455 [11 Cal.
Rptr. 373, 3;)9 P.2d 925] ; City & County of San Francisco v.
Superior Court, 37 Ca1.2d 227, 236-238 [231 P.2d 26,25
A.L.R.2d 1418J.)
[9] The prosecution, however, is entitled to discover the
names of the witnesses petitioner intends to call and any
reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence in
support of his particular affirmative defense of impotence. A
number of states have statutes permitting or requiring discovery in criminal cases of the identity of witnesses who are to
be called to testify for a defendant in connection with a particular defense, such as an alibi. (Sec Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent r, 49 Cal.L.Rev. 56, 61, n.
13; 6 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 1855 (b), pp. 418-420;
30 A.L.R.2d 480.) Although such discovery may require a
defendant to disclose information that would lead to effective
rebuttal of his defense, these statutes have uniformly been
upheld against the claim that they violate the privilege against
self-crimination. (State v. Smetana, 131 Ohio St. 329 (2 N.E.2d
778] ; State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 4 [176 N.E. 656, 75
A.L.R. 48]; People v. Sh1tlenberg, 279 App.Div. 1115 {112
N.Y.S.2d 374, 375] ; People v. Rakicc, 260 App.Div. 452 123
N.Y.S.2d 607, 612-613] ; People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212 [292
N.Y.S. 612, 615-619] ; State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 75-76 [51
N.W.2d 495,30 A.L.R.2d 476].) The identity of the defense
witnesses and the existence of any reports or X-rays the defense offers in evidence will nccessarily be revealed at the
trial. The witnesses will be subject to cross-examination, and
the reports and X-rays subject to study and challenge. Learn.
ing the identity of the defense witnesses and of such reports
and X-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution to perform its function at the trial more effectively. Thus," the alibi
statutes do not infringe on Hie privilege against self-incrimination. Rather, they set up a wholly reasonable rule of pleading which in no manner compels a defendant to give any evidence other than that which he will voluntarily and without
compulsion give at trial. Such statutes do .not violate the
right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather they say to
the accused: If you don't intend to remain silent, if you
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expect to offer an alibi defense, then advance notice and
whereabouts must be forthcoming; but if you personally and
your potential witnesses elect to remain silent throughout the
trial, we have no desire to break that silence by any requirement of this statute." (Dean, Advance Specification of Defense in Oriminal Oases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435, 440.)
Insofar as the trial court's order herein requires petitioner
to reveal the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to
call and to produce reports and X-rays he intends to introduce
in evidence to support his defense of impotence, it does not
violate the privilege against self-crimination. Nor to this extent
does it violate the attorney.client privilege. It simply requires
petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal
anyway. Such information is discoverable. The order, however, is not limited to the discovery of such information, and
therefore cannot be enforced in its present form.
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining the
trial court frOID proceeding in a manner inconsistent with the
views expressed herein.
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred.
PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree with the
majority opinion insofar as it holds that a "peremptory writ
of prohibition issue restraining the trial court," but I dissent
from the holding that the trial court may permit the prosecution "to discover the names of the witnesses petitioner intends
to call and any reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in
evidence in support of his particular affirmative defense of
impotence." This last-quoted holding, in my opinion, violates
the fundamental constitutional rights of defendant.
The Constitution of California (art. I, § 13) provides that
"No person shall ... be compelled, in any criminal case, to
be a witness against himself; . . . " but his failure to explain
"the case against him" may be commented on by court and
counsel. Section 688 of the Penal Code provides "No person
ean be compelled, in a criminal action, to be a witness against
Hmself; ... " Section 1323 of the Penal Code states the same
thought in the following language: "A defendant in a criminal action or proceeding can not be compelled to be a witness
against himself; . . ." Section 1323.5 provides that in all
criminal proceedings "the person accused or charged shaH, at
his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent
witness. "
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These guarantees are fundamental, unlimited, aud absolute.
They are discussed at length in People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.
2d 650 [245 P.2d 633]. Until today these principles have never
been challenged successfully. In that case it was stated that
(p. 664): "under these constitutional and statutory provisions the right of the defendant to remain silent is absolute
except that the prosecution may comment if the defendant
fails 'to explain or to deuyby his testimony any evidence or
faets in the case against him.' Thus, by express constitutional
and statutory limitation comment is allo\ved only when the
prosecution has first made out a case that the accused can or
should dellY. At the inceptiollof the case, obviously,the prosecution has developed no facts at all that the accused can deny.
As was said in People v. Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d '.l66, 471 [115
P.2d 1001] : 'The fact that the constitutional provision provides that in a criminal casC', whether or not the defendant
testifies, his failure to explain or deny by his testimony any
evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented
upon by the court or counsel and may be considered by the
court or the jury, does not deprive a defendant of his right
to stand mute, nor docs it rclease the prosecution or the burden of establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and
by competent and legal evidence.'
"Under a propcr interpretation of these quoted provisions,
an accused has the right to stand mute, clothed in the presumption of innocence, until the prosecution, at the trial, has
made out a prima facie case against him. Until that has been
done, it is improper to even comment on his silence." Cases
are cited holding that it is even improper to compel the defendant to give his name or address, or to be compelled to
assert before the jury his constitutional right to be silent.
Reference is made to the case of United States v. Housing
Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665, written by Judge Goodrich, who held (p. 666) that compelling a defendant to give
evidence against himself "is so fundamental an error that the
judgment must be reversed .... The error made arises from
confusing the'privilege of any witness not to give incriminating answers with the right of the accused not to take the stand
in a criminal prosecution against him."1
Compelling the accused to give testimony prior to the establishment of a prima facie case against him is described in
TaUs (p. 667) as a "flagrant, shocking and prejudicial inva. 1Thia same confusion is

)

nppan'nt in the majority opinion.
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sion of appellant's constitutional rights," a description
equally applicable to the instant case. At page 676, the court,
after again pointing out that the accused has a "right to
remain silent" until a prima facie case has been established
against him, stated "Those accused of crime are not required
to cooperate with the prosecution. The prosecution has the
duty of proving that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, and until that is done, the accused may remain silent."
The court pointed out that the argument that otherwise the
guilty may go free is no justification for a violation of those
constitutional rights. It used the following language directly
applicable to the instant case (p. 678): "Prosecuting those
accused of crime is often a tedious and tiresome process.
But this is the process required by law, and short cuts cannot
be tolerated. Constitutional guarantees are not arbitrary pronouncements adopted to protect the guilty, and to make it
difficult for sincere hardworking prosecutors. They are the
result of hundreds of years of struggle in fighting governmental oppression. They are necessary to protect the innocent.
If an accused, even a guilty accused, cannot be convicted
except by a violation of these principles, then he should not
and cannot be lawfully convicted."
These principles are fundamental. The majority seek .to
escape their application by a series of false rationalizations
and non sequiturs. They talk about the inherent fairness of
compelling the defendant to divulge the names and reports
of his witnesses, and state that such discovery procedures will
aid "to ascertain the truth," and conclude that the violation
of defendant's rights is not very serious because the requested
information "will necessarily be revealed at the trial," and
" [I] earning the identity of the defense witnesses and of such
. reports and x-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution
to perform its function at the trial more effectively." The
majority point to the cases that permit the defendant pretrial
discovery, and conclude that "when this court permitted dis. covery in advance of as well as at the trial [citations), it was
not acting under constitutional compulsion but to promote the
orderly ascertainment of the truth. That procedure should
not be a one-way street."
These rationalizations could be used to justify the Inquisition,
: and the use of the rack and the screw. The "one-way street"
, argument is obviously fallacious. The simple fact is that our
: system of criminal procedure is founded upon the principle
; that the ascertainment of the facts is a "one-way street." It is
~

)

)
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the f'Ollstitlltio!l:tl :'ighl 0:' the dt'fellllunt, who is presul1,eu to
be inllocent, to st,md l'ih'llt while the state attempts to meet
its hlmlt'll ot' pl'oof, that is, to prove the defendant':; guilt
beyond a rea:SQlIahlt, dou ut, Tfhl' tll'fl'nilant, up until )lOW, ilid
not haw to take n naetive part ill the ascertainment of the
fads. 'l'l!e majority opinion dol'S not m::-rdy enlarge a simple
judicial principle of pretrial procedure, it fUlldamentally
alters our concepts or the rig-Lt.; of the accused, and forces
him to coltle fOny,lrd w;tl1 i;)formation before the prosecution
lIas pres('nted a ease a~ainst him.
The argnmellt that bl'c8.us(' this court granted discovery to
the deren(lant, it r.hould grant it to the prosecution, fails to
consider the l1atll~·t' of the defclltlant's right to pretrial discoyery. ·WhiL! the ea.l'S estahlislling this right, rited by the
majority, did hol(1 that snch right was not compelled hy the
due proeess elaw;(.', tlll'Y al:-;o recognized and held that the
defendant was t'lltitleJ to ~:uch discovery as part of the fair
trial impliedly grant~'(! to him by artie1e I, section 13, of the
state Constitutioa. MallY or the eases recognized (see parti<:ularly POlCell Y. Superior C'Iurl, 48 Ca1.2d 704, 706-707 [312
P.2d 698] ; People v. R:'scl', 4j Ca1.2d 566, 586 [303 P.2d 1])
that to give tll(' defC'l!l1ant pretrial discovery mi[!'ht create au
imbalanee between the }H'os<'eutioll and defense', but held that
such imbalanee was inherent in our system of criminal procedure. ,\Vhilt.>, of course', a ('I'ill~itlal trial should be "fair" to
the prosecution as well as to thc defense, it should not be
forgotten that the defendant bas additional constitutional and
statutory rights not giwn to the p,·os('cution. The right not to
incriminate himself, ttH' right to remain absolutely mute ulltil
a prima faeie case has vern established, the right to the presumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, are a few of thc.qc rights that completely refute
the" one-way street" argument.
The majority giye lip sCrYice to the existence of these rights
and then ema'l('ulate th(,lll by holdillg that they (to not apply
where the r~qu('st('d information refers to a so-raIled "affirmative" defense. In other words the majority see no harm in
judicially creatillg- a right in the prosecution to compel the
defendant to dis(·lose the ll:lnit'3 of the witnesses he may intend
to call and the X-I'a:--,., :Iud reports he may intend to introduce
as long as these only relate to the affirmative defense that
defendant disclosed 011 the motion for a continuance. The basis
for this distinction apparrlltly is that the sought after material
will not or perhaps ran not be used by the prosecution in

sa
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{'stablishillg its prima facie case but only to rebut this possible
affirmative defense. In other words, as I understand themajority, they hold that the defendant's constitutional right to
i
remain silent, and his constitutional privilege against self in~ri~dinatiolln, exhist 10nIY so llon g as heffi does. notddfisclose, Iefvehn -..
mCI enta y, t at Ie may lave an a rmahve e ense.
e
does so disclost', prior to trial,lle can be compelled to divulge.
his evidence ill snpport of it. I suppose that, if 011 the motion
·for a continuance, the defendant lIad averred that he needed
I
more time to look for witnesses that would testify a third
person committed the offense, the majority would see no harm
in compelling him to disclose, prior to trial, the names of the
witnesses and the name of the third party. This, too, would
he an "affirmative defense." In fact, any defense other than
to attempt to refute the prosecution's witnesses, is an "affirmative" defense.
This type of Clreasoning" overlooks the possibility that the
compelled revelation by the defendant that he may hav\! only
a weak defense may itself be self-criminating. Until today, in
California, a defendant could weigh his proposed defense
against the prosecution's case, and not make up his mind until
he heal'd the strength or weakness of the case against him
,vhether he would rely on a straight not guilty defense or .
urge an "affirmative" defense. Now he must make that·
decision before the state's presentation. If the majority O}>inion were sound, it ,vould mean logically that the prosecution
could serve interrogatories upon a defendant demanding to
know whether or not he intends to rely 011 an "affirmative"
defense, what it is, and what evidence he has to support it.
I am not willing to see fundamental constitutional rights emasculated in this fashion.
This claimed distinction behveen a defense and an affirmative defense is a spurious oue. Trial courts are neither omnipotent nor omniscient. It is a logical impossibility for a trial
court to determine in advance what illformation requested by
the prosecution relates solely to an affirmative defense and
what info11llation will not aid the prosecution in the preparation of its case against defendant. This is.so because innocence
is the very antithesis of gvilt. Anything bearing upon one
necessarily affects the other. It is the state's obligation to
prove the guilt of defendant. It is defendant's choice to determine whether he will set up an "affirmative" defense to
prove his innocence or simply deny guilt. But until the prose.cution has made out a prima facie case against him, he is not

1. '
l'
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and should not bc compcUt'd toasslstthe prosecution either in
its case in chief or iri rebuttal of h~spossible defense.
It will not do to say that the impairment of constitutional
rights is' only minor ill the .instant case,alld for that reason
no one should get excited about it. The admonition given by
the United States SuprcuieCoul't in Boydv. .united States,
116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct.524, 29 L ..Ed.746J. is as sound today as
it was 77 years ago. It was there stated (p~ 635) :
.
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but il~egitimate alid unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in that way,namely, by silent
approaches and slight ueviations from Jegalmodesof prOcedure. Thill can only be obviated<by adhering to the rule that
constitutional provisions iorthe.security of person and prop- ': .. "
erty should be libt'rnlly eonstrued..Aclose and literal construction deprives them of .half tlleirefficacy, and leads to
gradual depreciation of the 'risht,as if it consisted more in
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any
stealthy encroachments thereon."
The majority rely on the alibi defense statutes found in
several states, and upon two early Ohio cases, three intermediate New York appellate court cases, and a Wisconsin case
upholding them. No federal case upholding such a statute
is cited. The majority seem to reason that since Borne states
by statute have compelled disclosure of the evidence in support of an alibi prior to' trial, California by judicial mandate
should create a similar rule as to affirmative defenses generally. We are not told what the constitutional provisions are
in such states, nor whether an alibi defense may not be
different from other affirmative defenses. The short and complete answer to this argument is, that if tIle Legislature tried
by statute to adopt the rule announced by the majority, such
.
statute would, in California, be unconstitutional.
Moreover, e,,'en if such a supposed statute would be consti- .
tutional, th~ point need Hot be labored that that is no legal
reason why this comt should legislate in tne matter. It is no
argument to say that this eOllrt "legislated" in favor of the
defendant, and therefore SIlO'uM "l<'gislate" in favor of the
prosecution. As nlrt'ady pointed out, tlle holdings in reference
to pretrial discovery hy def(~lldant were predi\~ated on concepts
that were held to compel snch holdings in favor of defendants,
but there are no such concepts that even suggest, far le!)s
compel, such a conclusion in favor of the prosecution. Thus

)

68

JONES V. Sm'ERIOR COURT

[58 C.2([

this court did not "legislate" in those cases. It is attempting
to legislate now. I agree with what .Judge Pierce said in hi!';
concurring opinion when this case was before the District
Court of Appeal (Ca1.App.) 17 Ca1.Rptr. 575, 578-579: "But
the Legislature has not elected to tackle the ticklish problems
of discovery in criminal cases directed against defendants and
within that inconsiderable area bounded by the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination. ldo not find any inllerent
judicial power to preempt this excursion into procedural reo
form. I believe that if the innovation is to come it should be
the product of the lawmakers, not of the courts. Therefore I
would hold that, absent legislation, rio power exists in the
trial court to command the defendant to produce the informa.
tion here sought to be compelled." I add to that the thought
that the assumption that the courts and not the Legislature are
better equipped to determine policy in this field violates the
separation of powers doctrine. The people, through their Coustitution, have seen fit to confer this power on the Legislature
and to deny it to the courts.
The writ should issue prohibitiug all disclosure.
DOOLING, J.-I dissent from the majority opinion insofar
as it authorizes discovery against a defendant in a criminal
case. Admittedly discovery in criminal cases in this state is
court-created. Heretofore, as noted in the majority opinion,
it has been limited to discovery by the defendant. Historically
and by constitutional safeguards the right of defendants in
criminal cases to be free of any procedure savoring of judicial
inquisition has been jealously protected. As Justice Peters
points out in his dissenting opinion, at least absent some legislative provision such as those with regard to the defense of
alibi referred to in the majority opinion,a defendant in a
criminal case has never been compelled, in advance of the
production of the prosecution's evidence against him, to deter·
mine upon what if any defenses he may ultimately rely. The
opinion 9f the majority in this case makes a breach, even if a
comparatively small on£', in this right of this defendant and
compels him now to commit himself to refmin from interposing the affirmative defense of impotency unless he make~
certain disclosures to the prosecution in advance of the trial. I
am fearful, not so much of the step taken in this ease, as of
its possible implications. It is purely .hy virtue of the acddental fact that the defendant in this case asked for a continuance to procure evidence to support a claim of impotency
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that the prosc.;utiol1 was uware of the possibility that such a
d<.>fellse might be inh'l'po,;ed. Xorll1ally the nature of his
defenses woul<1not be disdosed by the defelluant in advance of
trial. Are we laying down a rule in this case limited to similar
cases, i.e., to cases in which for some reason the defendant
in advance of trial chances to disclose in some manner his
intention to rely upon some affirmative defense 1 If so the
cases will be rare intleed in which the prosecution will be
entitled to discovery. Or are we opening the door, as Justice
Peters suggests, to a geueral inquiry by the prosecution
whether the defendant intends to rely on any affirmative
defense and if so what the llature of such affirmative uefense
may be Y If the latter, alld this seems the logical conclusion
from the majority's holding, by court-made rule we arc
depriving the defendaut of the right which he heretofore
always eujoYeLl of waiting until the close of the pros~cution 's
case to determine the defense or defenses, if any, which he
might then interpose.
If the defendant's traditional freedom of action is thus to
be curtailed, that curtailment seems to me to be preeminently
a legislative and not a judieial function. The majority opinion
cites no case from any jurisdiction in which any court has
undertaken without statutory sanction to curtail this traditional right of a defendant, and I consider it unwise and
dangerous for this court to enter upon such delicate ground.
I have some doubt of the constitutional limitations on our
judicial power to subject a def{'ndant in a criminal case to
any form of discovery.•Justice Peters has elaborated the basis
of that doubt. But putting constitutional questions aside I am
fearful as a matter of policy of the future outcome of even so
small an initial court-created inroad upon the heretofore
unquestioned right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain
silent, if he chooses, at every stage of the proceeding against
him.
Peters, J., concurred.
~

Petitioner's appli!'ation for a rehearing was denied July 25,
1962. Dooling, J.,. partidpatcd in pJace of Traynor, J.
Peters, J., and Dooling, J.,. were of the opinion that the
application should be granted.

-Assigned by Chairman of JuuidaJ Council

